# I2P

> Source: https://fuckyc.org/services/i2p/
> Website: https://geti2p.net/
> Categories: Anonymity networks
> KYC: none — Network-layer anonymity protocol; no accounts, no central authority. Identity is a self-generated destination address.
> Status: active
> Jurisdiction: independent open source
> Fiat on-ramp: no
> Payment methods: donation
> Founded: 2003
> Open source: yes
> Custodial: no
> Last verified: 2026-05-12

## Verdict

I2P is the long-running peer to Tor for network-layer anonymity. Different design (garlic routing, in-network destinations as the primary use case) and different threat model. Best fit when in-network anonymous services are the use case, or as a Tor-complement for users who specifically want both networks in their threat model.

## Strengths

- Garlic routing — multiple messages bundled together, harder to correlate than Tor's onion routing.
- Designed for hidden-service-style use rather than exit-node traffic; outproxy is a separate concern.
- Active community development including i2pd (C++) and i2p+ (Java) implementations.

## Caveats

- Smaller user base than Tor — the anonymity set is smaller.
- Mostly used for in-network destinations; clearnet access via outproxies is less polished than Tor.
- Network has historically had eepsite uptime variance.

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## What I2P is

A network-layer anonymity protocol using garlic routing. The default use case is reaching in-network destinations (eepsites); accessing clearnet through I2P requires an outproxy.

## Threat-model fit

When in-network hidden services are the primary use case, or as a second anonymity network alongside Tor.

## Sources

- [I2P documentation](https://geti2p.net/en/docs) — accessed 2026-05-12
- [i2pd source](https://github.com/PurpleI2P/i2pd) — accessed 2026-05-12