# Cwtch

> Source: https://fuckyc.org/services/cwtch/
> Website: https://cwtch.im/
> Categories: Messaging
> KYC: none — Decentralized messaging with no central server. Identity is a self-generated key; transport is Tor v3 onion services. No phone, no email, no signup.
> Status: active
> Jurisdiction: independent open source (Open Privacy Research Society, Canada)
> Fiat on-ramp: no
> Payment methods: donation
> Founded: 2018
> Open source: yes
> Custodial: no
> Last verified: 2026-01-01

## Verdict

Cwtch is the no-server, Tor-onion-service-only messenger from Open Privacy. The architecture is the most metadata-minimizing in the category — no central party sees the social graph because there is no central party. The cost is the small user base and the Tor latency. For users in environments where any central server is part of the threat, Cwtch is the reference design.

## Strengths

- No accounts, no central server, no metadata aggregation point.
- Tor-onion-service transport by default.
- Group chats with cryptographic membership rather than trusted server.

## Caveats

- Smaller user base than Briar or SimpleX; finding contacts already on Cwtch is the friction.
- Tor-only transport means latency is what Tor latency is.
- Facts need re-verification by operator (last seeded 2026-01).

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## What Cwtch is

A peer-to-peer Tor-based messenger with no central server, no accounts, and cryptographic group membership.

## Threat-model fit

When "no central party" is the binding requirement and Tor latency is acceptable.

## Sources

- [Cwtch documentation](https://docs.cwtch.im/) — accessed 2026-01-01
- [Open Privacy Research Society](https://openprivacy.ca/) — accessed 2026-01-01